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POTENTIAL IMPAIRMENT OF COMPETITION-THE
IMPACT OF STANDARD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA
V. UNITED STATES ON THE STANDARD OF
LEGALITY UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
By Louis B. SCHWARTZ t
Monopoly survived the bite of the Sherman Act of 1890 in part
because the courts held that the prohibition of "restraint of trade"
covered only "unreasonable" restraints, and further that a restraint
was not unreasonable if imposed for recognized business purposes and
without obviously bad economic consequences. The Clayton Act of
1914 was supposed to put teeth in the old Sherman Act gums by
specifically naming and prohibiting the worst restraints: price dis-
crimination, exclusive dealing, and mergers of competing companies
through acquisition of stock control. The defenders of the status quo
succeeded in writing into the Clayton Act a limitation to cases
Where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly.
Still, this was not too bad. It seemed to limit inquiry to "effect,"
ruling out justification by motive or intent, and it clearly referred to
potentiality of harm rather than actual effects as the criterion of legal-
ity. How the courts, in the years after 1914, read the Sherman Act
"rule of reason" into the Clayton Act standard of legality is an old
story partly retold in the pages that follow. Standard Oil Company
of California v. United States,' however, marks the culmination of a
noticeable recent tendency to reaffirm the distinctive standard of the
Clayton Act.
The case created a curious division in the Supreme Court, as
might be expected in a day of uncertainty as to the meaning and con-
tinued validity of the old ideal of competition. As acute and positive
a judge as Jackson could profess doubt whether an exclusive dealing
contract was "a device for suppressing competition" or for "waging
competition." "Conservative" Justice Frankfurter wrote the major-
ity opinion striking down the device as anti-competitive, with "radical"
Justice Douglas dissenting. An analysis of these divergent views will
be helpful in determining the true impact of the decision, after which
it is proposed to consider its probable effect on the interpretation of the
Clayton Act standard of legality in relation to mergers and price dis-
crimination, as well as exclusive dealing.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
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Standard Oil Co. of California was the largest seller of gasoline
in the Western Area,' accounting for 23%o of the total gallonage. Of
this 6.8% was sold through company-owned service stations and 6.7%
($58,000,000 of annual business) through "independent" stations
bound by contract to purchase all their gasoline from Standard.
Standard's six leading competitors, who also employed the exclusive
outlet device, handled approximately 42.57 of the gasoline sold in
the Western Area, the remaining business being divided among more
than 70 smaller suppliers. In 1948 only 1.6% of the service stations
in the Area were "split-pump" stations, handling gasoline of more than
one supplier. The 5937 "independents" under exclusive dealing ar-
rangements with Standard constituted 16% of the retail gasoline out-
lets in the area. Standard's exclusive dealing contracts extended in
some cases to tires and other automobile accessories, covering about
2% of that business in the Western Area, with another 2% being
handled through company-owned stores.
A contract by which a dealer agrees to buy all his requirements
from one supplier is plainly within the language of the prohibition in
Section 3 of the Clayton Act,' a "contract for the sale of goods .
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that . . . the pur-
chaser shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor."
And Judge Yankwich in the District Court held that a contract sys-
tem covering so large a volume of business and excluding suppliers
from so many retail outlets did lessen competition substantially. He
excluded as immaterial testimony offered by Standard as to the busi-
ness reasons for the arrangement, and refused to make findings on the
basis of admitted evidence showing that Standard's comparative posi-
tion in the gasoline market had actually deteriorated slightly during
the period while exclusive supply contracts were employed. The
opinion rejected the notion that exclusive supply contracts are "illegal
per se" and seemed to call for a judicial inquiry into the "actual"
economic effect of the device.4 But the rulings on admission of evi-
dence and the findings show that the inquiry was limited to a determina-
tion of the volume of business covered by the contract ("a substantial
segment") and the relative position of Standard in the market. Per-
haps the holding can be fairly summarized as follows: exclusive supply
contracts affecting a substantial amount of business are illegal per se
when employed by a seller who is the major, although not necessarily
dominant, factor in the market.
2. The states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washing-
ton.
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1946).
4. United States v. Standard Oil Company, 78 F. Supp. 850, 863-864 (S. D. Cal.
1948).
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The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. He reviewed the Court's
previous interpretations of the Clayton Act standard and pointed out
that prior to International Salt Company v. United States ' some show-
ing of dominance of the market had been necessary to establish the
tendency of tying clauses to substantially lessen competition. In that
case, however, the Court had enjoined enforcement of provisions in
International's leases of patented salt dispensers requiring the lessee to
dispense only International salt through the leased machines. Al-
though International was the largest seller of salt for industrial pur-
poses, the record did not show that it "dominated" either the industrial
market for salt or the dispenser business. Upon a showing that
$500,000 of salt had been sold under the challenged leases in one year,
the tying clauses were held invalid, and Mr. Justice Jackson had writ-
ten that it was "unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market." ' That case might have been regarded as con-
trolling, but Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not treat it so. The circum-
stance of International's patent control and the economic distinctions
between "tying" and requirements contracts might be enough to dis-
tinguish the two cases. Patent control could be said to have given
the patentee "domination" of the salt business of those who must use
the patented dispenser, and doctrines independent of the antitrust laws
can be employed to hem in the patentee who so abuses the monopoly
privileges conferred by the patent.7  Tying can rarely serve any pur-
pose except to suppress competition, while requirements contracts, it
was said, might be to the buyer's as well as the seller's advantage,
assuring the former a constant supply of goods at a definite price with-
out the financial burden of a large inventory.' Accordingly, evidence
sufficient to establish that a tying clause tends to substantially lessen
competition might not support the same conclusion regarding a require-
ments contract.9
Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter felt compelled to carry over
to exclusive dealing contracts the strict rule formulated in the
5. 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
6. Id. at 396.
7. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U. S. 488 (1942).
8. At this point in the discussion Justice Frankfurter was obviously thinking of
a contract by which the seller guarantees to supply the buyer's requirements. There
is no economic advantage to a buyer in a contract limiting him to a single source of
supply, which is the specific issue presented by the ordinary Section 3 case. The dis-
tinction between the two can best be kept in mind by speaking of the restrictive aspect
of the arrangement as an "exclusive dealing contract" rather than a "requirements con-
tract."
9. On this basis a Note in 49 CoL. L. REv. 241 (1949) argues for a dual standard
of legality under section 3: a comparative substantiality test for exclusive dealing and
an absolute substantiality test for tying contracts.
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International Salt case for tying clauses, thus foreclosing, in a case
where the restrictive device is applied to a substantial segment of the
trade, inquiry into such questions as whether competition has increased
or diminished during the exclusive dealing period, whether the con-
tract is being employed by established oligarchs in the trade or against
them, and whether the contracts are reasonable in duration consider-
ing the business needs of the particular line of commerce. The major-
ity's refusal to compel consideration of such matters was based on two
grounds: (1) The result of such inquiries would be inconclusive; no
one could ever know whether Standard had maintained its relative
position as against its leading competitors by means of the exclusive
supply provisions or whether abolition of these contracts would in-
crease competition in view of alternative and possibly legal methods
open to Standard for preempting retail outlets; (2) Inquiry into the
economic merits of exclusive supply contracts, would be tantamount
to an investigation of their "reasonableness," reviving the very issue
which had rendered the Sherman Act ineffective against well known
restrictive devices, and which Congress intended to remove by the
Clayton Act."0 The trial court, therefore, had properly refused to
hear or consider evidence as to the actual effects and economic justifica-
tion of Standard's practices.
The demonstration that a broad economic inquiry would be im-
practical and contrary to Congressional intent justifies the District
Court's exclusion and disregard of evidence that Standard's hold on
the market had declined during the exclusive dealing period. It does
not, however, furnish support for the necessary affirmative finding that
exclusive dealing was likely to impair competition substantially. Here
the majority logic falters: "We conclude, therefore, that the qualify-
ing clause of § 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been fore-
closed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." " This
conclusion certainly does not follow from the discussion which im-
mediately preceded it, sustaining the trial court's exclusion of evidence.
It states the holding in such a fashion as to lead Justice Jackson to
protest against treating proof of the quantity of commerce covered by
the contracts as proof of their "forbidden quality," i. e., that there was
a causal relationship between the contracts and an observed or antici-
pated lessening of competition. It invited Justice Douglas' alarm,
since a 2% share of the automobile accessory market is treated as
"substantial" under the rule, apparently without regard to whether
10. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32 (1918) ; H. R.
REP. No. 627 on H. R. 15657, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. 10-13 (1914); United Shoe Ma-
chinery Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
11. 337 U. S. 293, 314 (1949).
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this is held by a powerful corporate giant or a newcomer breaking
into a market dominated by others.' 2 It does not follow the sugges-
tion in the body of the opinion that the basis for the necessary affirma-
tive finding as to the effect of the contracts is the fact that the relative
and combined positions of Standard and its competitors in the gasoline
market had remained nearly constant for some years, from which "it
would not be farfetched to infer" that they had "collectively, even
though not collusively" prevented late arrivals from breaking into the
market.' 3
A further doubt whether "foreclosure from a substantial share"
aptly expresses the holding of the Standard Oil case arises from the
significant shift in the theory upon which the injunction was sustained
in the Supreme Court. The District Court opinion can indeed be
read in support of the "substantial quantity affected" theory, for there
the case was treated as one of actual injury to competition measured
by the amount of business done under Standard's exclusive supply
contracts. This "appreciable segment" of the trade was said to have
been fenced in, and comparisons were made with the boycott cases.
But the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of probability of impaired
competition: "such a potential clog on competition as it was the pur-
pose of Section 3 to remove wherever, were it to become actual, it
would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity." ' Clearly,
if the amount of commerce affected determines the harmful character
of a restrictive device, there was no question of possibilities or prob-
abilities in this case. The amount of commerce affected was known,
measured by the gallonage sold under the suspect contracts. The
Supreme Court, like the District Court, would have weighed the sub-
stantiality of the actual restraint. Instead, despite uncontested proof
that the restrictive contract applied to 16% of the western service sta-
tions and some 65 million dollars of annual business, Justice Frank-
furter held only that the potentiality of impaired competition required
an adverse ruling. As will be more fully shown, the majority de-
cision can be rested more securely on the facts of Standard's position
in the trade rather than on the declared rule as to exclusion from a
substantial quantity of commerce.
12. At one point Justice Frankfurter's opinion seems explicitly to exclude this
consideration. Id. at 308.
13. It is not surprising that the opinion merely suggests this, for Judge Yankwich
had drawn no such inference and had even deliberately refused to make the factual
findings as to relative position of Standard and its competitors, from which such an in-
ference might have been drawn. He was asked to reconsider his original decision on
the ground that United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948), which
had just been decided, required legality to be determined with reference to "competi-
tive setting" rather than the mere quantity of commerce restrained. See Standard's
Brief in the Supreme Court, pp. 48-52, and Record, pp. 142-157.
14. 337 U. S. 293, 314 (1949).
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Justice Jackson, speaking also for the Chief Justice and Justice
Burton, saw no way of deciding whether exclusive supply contracts
tend to substantially lessen competition except by considering evidence
of the sort offered by the defendant. He would, therefore, have vacated
the decree with a direction to complete the case by hearing evidence
as to the actual effect of the practice. If the contracts were to be
judged without such evidence, Justice Jackson thought them "an
almost necessary means" of maintaining the all important competition
between the oil companies. The majority decision is characterized as
applying the "lash of the antitrust laws" to "a successful method of
competing". Jackson argued that the exclusive supply contracts
are desirable from the retailer's point of view because they assure him
a continuous supply of gasoline to sell, since no supplier would be
willing to guarantee continuous supply to a dealer who was free to buy
elsewhere. This reasoning converts an obligation restricting the
retailer to a single source of supply into a source of strength to the
retailer. To this argument the following observation from the major-
ity opinion seems a complete answer:
If in fact it is economically desirable for service stations to con-
fine themselves to the sale of petroleum products of a single sup-
plier, they will continue to do so though not bound by contract,
and if in fact it is important to retail dealers to assure the supply
of their requirements by obtaining the commitment of a single
supplier to fulfill them, competition for their patronage should
enable them to insist upon such an arrangement without binding
them to refrain from looking elsewhere."
But the main import of Jackson's dissenting opinion is that the in-
dividual dealer does not count for much. There is a complete abandon-
ment of the ideal of preserving individual initiative and economic free-
dom as the aim of the competitive system, a full embrace of the con-
ception of "monopolistic competition" which big business or perhaps
the inevitable drift of our institutions seems to be substituting for the
Sherman Act ideal. Individual retail gas dealers are mere "conduits"
for gasoline, in Jackson's view, without initiative or economic freedom
worth preserving-mere "means by which the oil companies com-
pete." 16 This is competition of the sort envisioned by the Miller-
15. Id. at 313; cf. note 8 supra. The dealer in any event should be free to select
what seems to him the most desirable relationship; i. e., exclusive or non-exclusive
arrangements. The policy of all the leading oil companies to make only exclusive
arrangements can hardly be justified on the basis that it is for the dealer's best inter-
est, if it gives the dealer no choice in the matter.
16. Id. at 323.
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Tydings amendment to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, under which
manufacturers prescribe prices for retailers of their goods, and com-
mercial rivalry is safely confined to relations between manufacturers.
But the Miller-Tydings amendment was a conscious relaxation of Sher-
man Act standards, while the Clayton Act provisions here in question
were supposed to reinforce the Sherman Act. The combination of
prescribed prices and exclusive dealing reduces the "independent"
service station to a capitalistic zero. His profit, which supposedly
reflects his skill as an entrepeneur in selecting sources of supply and
gauging the price at which operation in his own immediate market will
be most successful, loses touch with these factors.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion is as remarkable. Where
Jackson vindicates the exclusive supply contract as an instrument of
competition among the oil companies, Douglas eulogizes it as the last
bastion of independent retailers, "an inducement for their survival." "
Douglas treats certain statements in the majority opinion as an in-
vitation to the oil companies to substitute station ownership or
''agency" arrangements for the relatively innocuous exclusive supply
relationship, and finds in these statements an advisory opinion in favor
of the legality of such arrangements.' There is indeed little basis in
the present state of the antitrust decisions for challenging the legality
of a 23%o market control not achieved by illegal methods nor employed
coercively; but one may doubt whether the majority opinion was in-
tended to foreclose that question, especially in view of the concurrence
of such known subscribers to the antitrust philosophy as Justices Black,
Murphy and Rutledge. Moreover, the majority decision favors decen-
tralization of control at least to the extent that the companies are
forced back upon techniques of expansion which they had found less
desirable than the independent exclusive dealer. Under the agency
system which preceded it, the companies found themselves burdened
with the legal responsibilities of employers in such regards as tort
liability, social security taxes and obligation to reemploy veterans,'9
whereas the exclusive dealer set-up gave substantially the same cen-
tralized control without these disadvantages.
In this most paradoxical case it is Frankfurter who brushes aside
a factitious "independence" of dealers tied to Standard by exclusive
supply contracts, thus clearing the way to a direct facing of the issue
whether Standard lawfully controls its large share of the western
17. Id. at 320.
18. Justice Douglas is more likely to regret his own advisory opinion that "today
there is vigorous competition between the oil companies for the market," ibid., a view
which would do more to protect the existing structure of the petroleum industry than
the abolition of exclusive supply contracts as a competitive weapon for industry leaders.
19. Cf. Hudspeth v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 170 F. 2d 418 (8th Cir. 1948).
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business; while Douglas, the apostle of economic liberty on the Court,
clings to the fiction of retailer independence despite the realities of
company ownership of the land, leases on terms which give the
operator little discretion in the operation of "his" business, and the
obligation of the dealer to buy exclusively from his lessor. The
Douglas opinion must be regarded as only a reiteration of his dis-
appointment with the Court's conservatism in the Columbia Steel 2
and Paramount 21 cases, where threats to free enterprise graver than
the exclusive supply contract did not incur condemnation under the
Sherman Act.
Douglas' opinion aside, the basic issue which divided the Court
was the kind and amount of evidence required under the Clayton Act
to establish that "the effect" of a given restraint "may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition." Majority as well as minority proceed
on the hypothesis that something more than a mere possibility of
impaired competition is required by the Act.22 Both sides agree on
the necessity of proof on this issue. However, since the dissenting
opinion does take the majority to task for holding exclusive supply
contracts "illegal per se" and dispensing with proof of substantial
lessening of competition, it will be necessary to demonstrate briefly that
the area of disagreement was narrower than the dissent indicates.
In the first place there is not a word in the majority opinion to
support the suggestion that exclusive supply contracts are held "illegal
per se." The phrase is a part of the common vocabulary of this area
of the law and could not have been omitted unintentionally by as precise
a draftsman as Justice Frankfurter. The deliberate failure to use
the phrase can only mean that the propriety of the exclusive supply
contract remains to l;e determined by the circumstances. This judg-
ment is confirmed by references in the majority opinion to circum-
stances which in this case could be deemed sufficient to bring the con-
tracts under the ban of the Clayton Act:' Standard's leading, although
not singly dominant, position in the gasoline business in the area, and
the prevalence of the device among the other most powerful oil com-
panies competing with Standard. The first of these circumstances
invokes a principle that pervades all the antitrust laws, that legal rights
innocent in themselves easily become the instrument of abuse when
lodged in the hands of economic giants. Given an enterprise of suffi-
20. 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
21. 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
22. 337 U. S. 293, 300-301 (1949) ; but cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37,
46 (1948), espousing the "reasonable possibility" test, with Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter dissenting. A legislative declaration of the "reasonable probability" rule
seems likely to be enacted by the current Congress. See §4(D) of S. 1008, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., as printed for the Senate on August 8, 1949.
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cient size even the elementary legal privileges to contract, to acquire
property, to expand one's business in anticipation of expanding de-
mand, have been circumscribed.2 3 The importance of industry position
in determining whether a given practice has dangerous anti-competitive
potentialities has frequently been noted. As Justice Douglas pointed
out in United States v. Paramount Pictures: "Size is itself an ear-
mark of monopoly power. For size carries with it an opportunity
for abuse."
'2 4
The second circumstance, general employment of the exclusive
supply contracts by all the leading petroleum suppliers, has this sig-
nificance, that for the great majority of independent service stations
there was no opportunity to elect between an exclusive relationship
with Company A and a non-exclusive relationship with Company B.
Whatever generalizations can safely be made as to the advantage or
disadvantage of the exclusive supply contract to the buyer, some
buyers left to their own devices would undoubtedly prefer to handle
more than one brand and to be free to change suppliers at will.
Their choice in this regard is plainly more restricted when all the lead-
ing suppliers offer only exclusive supply contracts or give preferen-
tial treatment to exclusive supply dealers. The impact on dealer
freedom is sharper when all companies use the same restrictive device
even if it be assumed that they do not act collusively.2 5
If the Standard Oil case is regarded as holding (1) that the in-
ference of adverse effect on competition may be drawn from the sole
circumstance of defendant's powerful, though not monopolistic, position
in the trade, and (2) that such a defendant cannot justify the employ-
ment of prima facie restrictive devices by evidence purporting to show
the non-monopolistic effects or the business advantages of the prac-
tice; then the case falls neatly into a tradition which goes back to the
famous Standard Fashion case,26 and needs no reliance on the Inter-
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d 'Cir. 1945).
24. 334 U. S. 131, 174 (1948). See Stockhausen, The Commercial and Antitrust
AsPects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. 412, 428-431 (1948);
Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rnv. 175, 223 (1936) ; Mr. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 438, 441 (1920).
25. Cf. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948),
sustaining a count under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which, without
alleging conspiracy, charged that each defendant employed a basing point pricing
formula with knowledge that the others were doing the same and with the result that
price competition between them was restrained. The case was affirmed by an equally
divided court in Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U. S. 902 (1949). See Signode
Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F. 2d 48, 54 (4th Cir. 1942). Compare Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 335 U. S. 303 (1948) as to effect on free competition in automo-
bile financing of affiliations between each of the Big Three manufacturers with a
single finance company. See Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Con-
trol) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. VI, c. 66, §§ 3, 4, applying to groups who "whether by
agreement or arrangement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to
prevent or restrict competition."
26. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922).
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national Salt case, which is distinguishable by the circumstance of
patent control. It furnishes a logical answer to the demand of the
defendants and the dissenters that some factor in addition to the re-
straint inherent in the device be found, in order to satisfy the qualify-
ing clause of Section 3. It minimizes the danger of encouraging big-
ness which alienated Justice Douglas. Finally, it makes good sense
in terms of legislative history and the objectives of the antitrust laws,
recognizing that small businessmen and newcomers may safely be al-
lowed to use business devices which would be lethal to competition if
employed by powerful economic organizations.
EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND TYING
The decision in the Standard Oil case condemning exclusive sup-
ply contracts when employed by a giant distributor, without further
inquiry into the effects of or the business justification for the device, is
a reaffirmation under remarkably similar circumstances of the Supreme
Court's judgment in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.
27
That case is better known for its dictum that the word "may" in the
Clayton Act standard means probability rather than possibility of im-
pairment of competition, than it is for the holding which, upon analysis,
proves to be precisely that the leader in a line of business may not
use exclusive supply contracts, and that a court may disregard evi-
dence of the alleged beneficent effects of such contracts under these
circumstances.
Standard Fashion Company sought to enjoin Magrane-Houston,
a Boston department store, from selling dress patterns of the rival
McCall Company. Magrane-Houston had contracted to handle Stand-
ard Fashion patterns exclusively for a term of two years. The defend-
ant invoked the then recently enacted Clayton Act, whereupon plain-
tiff undertook to prove that its contracts were customary in the trade
and beneficial alike to manufacturers, dealers and the public. Although
the trial judge initially showed some resistance to a broad inquiry into
industry practice,2" the evidence took a wide range. Plaintiff's Presi-
dent Scanlon was allowed to explain the advantage to "the manufac-
turer, the agent and the public, to have an agent handle only one make
of pattern." 29 He testified that exclusive arrangements were the nor-
mal way of doing business in this trade,"0 that duplication of investment
in inventory and additional selling expense involved in handling a
27. 258 U. S. 346 (1922).
28. Transcript of Record, p. 36, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U. S. 346 (1922).
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 45.
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number of different brands of patterns would handicap the dealer.
The public would be hurt because a dealer who undertook to handle
several lines of patterns would probably be unable to stock all sizes
in each line. From the manufacturer's point of view there would be
an increase in the number of unsold patterns returned by dealers. The
cost of doing business would therefore rise to the point of requiring
a very substantial increase in the retail price to the public."' Scanlon
also testified to bitter competition among pattern manufacturers, 2 and
showed that the leading competitors of Standard had gone into busi-
ness and grown to power during the period while the Standard exclu-
sive supply contract was in use.33  On cross-examinatkon defense
counsel extracted from Scanlon admissions that large retailers like
Macy's and Marshall Field, who were in a position to bargain effec-
tively with the manufacturers, were permitted to handle several pattern
lines and found it profitable; and that it was the manufacturers who
chose the exclusive supply system, "the basis on which they find it
most advantageous to do business." "
The principal defense contribution to the inquiry as to the legality
of the contract was proof that Standard Fashion was under common
control with two other leading pattern manufacturers and that the
combination had exclusive supply contracts with 20,000 of the 52,000
retail outlets in the country.3 5
This testimony as to the position of Standard Fashion in the
trade was the only circumstance referred to in the opinion of District
Judge Johnson."' Like Judge Yankwich 30 years later, Judge Johnson
had received in evidence a considerable amount of testimony which,
upon reflection, he determined to ignore, since, as he put it, the issue
under the Clayton Act was "whether or not the contract has provided
means for a real or substantial lessening of competition, irrespective of
what use has been made or is being made of these means." The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.3 7 Again the only
circumstance specifically referred to is plaintiff's control of 20,000 out
of 52,000 pattern outlets. Not a word is devoted to the evidence of
the contract's alleged advantages to manufacturer, dealer and public,
although the opinion does profess generally to "consider this restric-
tion in the light of the facts peculiar to the business to which the
31. Id. at 36-38.
32. Id. at 41, 64.
33. Id. at 40, 42-3.
34. Id. at 78, 122.
35. Id. at 83-4, 107.
36. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 254 Fed. 493, 499 (D. Mass.
1918).
37. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 259 Fed. 793 (1st Cir. 1919).
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restraint is applied, to the conditions already achieved under such
restraint, as well as the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable." " The opinion reviewed the legislative history of the Clay-
ton Act, quoting Ifrom Committee Reports to show Congress' purpose
to go beyond the Sherman Act by specifically prohibiting certain trade
practices.3 9
The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United
States by Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice. His powerful
brief wrung the utmost from the language of the Clayton Act and its
legislative history.4" Considering with justification that the Circuit
38. Id. at 798.
39. Id. at 796-7.
40. In brief outline the course of enactment of the presently relevant Clayton Act
provisions was as follows: As part of the Wilsonian Fair Deal and in satisfaction of
Democratic platform declaration for strengthening the antitrust laws [see 51 CONG.
REc. 16, 143 (1914)], the President's message to Congress of Jan. 20, 1941, called
for "prohibition" of restrictive practices which had become familiar enough by ex-
perience to permit definition, "in such terms as will practically eliminate uncertainty."
51 CONG. REc. 1163 (1914). The Clayton Bill, H. R. 15657, 63d Cong., undertook to
do this by prescribing criminal penalties for price discrimination, exclusive dealing
and tying contracts, and "holding companies," among other things. The discrimination
offense required an intent to injure a competitor. The holding company section
(equivalent to present section 7) applied "where the effect is to eliminate or substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock i'so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition, or to create a monopoly of any line of trade in any
section or community." The exclusive dealing offense required neither intent nor any
effect.
Congressman Clayton's report for the House Judiciary Committee described the
use of local price cutting as a "common practice of great and powerful combinations
engaged in commerce-notably the Standard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co.,
and others of less notoriety, but of great influence." H. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1914). Exclusive dealing was attacked as an impairment of the dealer's
right to select his own suppliers: "Where the concern making these contracts is al-
ready great and powerful . . . the exclusive or tying contract made with
local dealers becomes one of the greatest agencies and instrumentalities of
monopoly ever devised by the brain of man. It completely shuts out com-
petitors, not only from trade in which they are already engaged, but from the
opportunities to build up trade in any community where these great and powerful com-
binations are operating under this system and practice." Id. at 13. The qualification
of the prohibition against stock acquisition is not specifically commented on.
'The Senate Judiciary Committee deleted the criminal penalties in view of the
"experimental" character of the legislation and the concurrent creation of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to enforce civil sanctions. SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 43 (1914). Explicit reference to competition in localities was stricken out as
surplusage. Id. at 43, 46.
The Conference Report shows the adoption of a substitute Section 2, accepting the
Senate view on civil enforcement, but substituting the test of putative effect for that
of intent to injure competition. The House Managers remarked that this "eliminates
the penalty of the original House bill, but declares the acts therein forbidden to be
unlawful." H. R. REP. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1914). The insertion of the
same qualifying clause in Section 3. where intent had never been required, was not
explained in the report, and was severely criticized in the subsequent Senate debates.
In Section 7, the Conferees pointedly substituted "effect may be" for "effect is," in
conformity with the clause inserted in Sections 2 and 3, evidently an additional quid
pro quo for the House yielding on criminal penalties. Id. at 12-13. The reference to
local restraints was restored in Section 7 without explaining either this action or the
failure to do the same in Sections 2 and 3. Id. at 12-13.
The debates resist rational summary, especially since the advocates of sternest
antitrust measures, in their opposition to amendments weakening the original House
measure, expressed extreme views of the debilitating consequences of the changes,
while moderates and conservatives deprecated as purely formal such changes as the
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Court of Appeals had paid little heed to any of the circumstances other
than the 20/52 control of Standard Fashion and its affiliates, he at-
tacked the judgment below for holding the contract "bad on its face
without any evidence that it tended to substantially lessen competition,"
and treated the qualifying clause as an outright return to the Sher-
man Act standard of legality, requiring an investigation of actual
effects, purposes, etc.
41
Because of the important public questions involved the Supreme
Court invited the United States to file a brief. Solicitor General
James M. Beck's response for the first time defined the issue otherwise
than in terms of the impossible alternatives of illegality per se and a
complete return to the Sherman Act standard, the first ruled out by the
qualifying clause in the Clayton Act prohibitions, the second by the
obvious determination of the 63rd Congress to tighten the antitrust
laws. He took the position that the sole purpose of the qualifying
clause was to save the use of exclusive dealing for "a small manufac-
turer attempting to enter a field already occupied by a monopoly or by
a very powerful economic unit." 42
The decision of the Supreme Court must be evaluated against this
background of the plaintiff's consistent effort to secure consideration
by the courts of the actual effects of its contracts, and their consistent
refusal to give that evidence any weight as against the circumstance
of Standard Fashion's position in the field. Mr. Justice Day delivered
the opinion affirming the judgment below. He had no difficulty con-
cluding that the Sherman Act "rule of reason" had been rejected by
the plain words of the Clayton Act which: ". . . sought to reach
the agreements embraced within its sphere in their incipiency, and, il
the section under consideration, to determine their legality by specific
tests of its own . . ." " However, there are in Justice Day's opin-
ion equivocations dangerous to the thesis of the present essay. The
forbidden agreements are those which "under the circumstances dis-
closed" will probably lessen competition. Is this a reference to all the
testimony for which Hughes vainly sought consideration, an admission
of its relevance, a requirement that the danger to competition be ad-
insertion of the word "substantial" in the Clayton Act standard. See, for example,
Sen. Reed at 51 CONG. REc. 15,830-1 (1914). and Sen. Walsh at 15,856-7, 16,149.
Small wonder that the Supreme Court has resorted to "plain language" construction
in interpreting the Clayton Act. Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278
U. S. 245 (1929). But cf. note 10 in the Standard Oil case, 337 U. S. 293, 307 (1949),
citing opposition from the floor of the House [51 CONG. REc. 9267 (1914)] to an abso-
lute prohibition of exclusive dealing on the ground of adverse effect on newcomers.
41. Petitioner's Brief, pp. 23, 46, 52, Standard Fashion v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U. S. 346 (1922).
42. Brief for the United States as Andcus Curiae, pp. 12-13, Standard Fashion v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922).
43. 258 U. S. 346, 356 (1922).
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judged on the basis of an appraisal of actual effects and on testimony
by economic experts forecasting the results of use or abolition of par-
ticular devices? It could be so argued, but Justice Day's brief opinion
concludes with a reference to only one circumstance of all those in evi-
dence, plaintiff's control of two-fifths of the pattern outlets of the
country, and with a significant quotation from the Circuit Court of
Appeals opinion:
The restriction of each merchant to one pattern manufacturer
must in hundreds, perhaps in thousands, of small communities,
amount to giving such single pattern manufacturer a monopoly
of the business in such community. Even in the larger cities, to
limit to a single pattern maker the pattern business of dealers most
resorted to by customers whose purchases tend to give fashions
their vogue may tend to facilitate further combinations; so that
the plaintiff, or some other aggressive concern, instead of con-
trolling two fifths, will shortly have almost, if not quite all the
pattern business.
This vision of danger is not derived from anything in the record.
These are "potentialities" inferred exclusively from the character of the
device and the position of its user-inferred directly in the face of testi-
mony that during the 20 years while Standard Fashion Company's
exclusive contracts had been in effect a number of powerful competitors
had successfully invaded the market and Standard's relative position
therein had declined.
The import of the Standard Fashion case may then be stated as
follows: A general inquiry of Sherman Act scope into the effect of the
exclusive supply contract is not called for by the Clayton Act; the door
is kept open for some showing of circumstances which might legalize
the use of these devices; the circumstance of paramount import is the
relative standing in the industry of the person who uses the device;
if he be among the leaders, then no demonstration of virtues of the
contract or actual effects of its use will overcome the substantial poten-
tiality of competitive impairment derived from the combination of large
size and restrictive contracts. In this connection large size does not
mean complete dominance in the Sherman Act monopoly sense," but
only a place among the leaders of the industry.
It is a formula which completely covers the Standard Oil case,
except that justifying testimony was admitted and counted for naught
in the earlier case, while Judge Yankwich simply refused to hear some
44. Cf. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), indicating that some-
thing more than 50% of the market must be controlled to bring business under § 2 of
the Sherman Act.
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of the justifying testimony, since what was offered could not under the
Standard Fashion case have prevailed in his judgment. That hardly
rises to a difference of substance. Even under the broad public interest
standard of the Sherman Act the Supreme Court has made it clear
that evidence of reasonableness need not be heard when it could not
swing the balance in favor of the restraint.45
It remains to inquire whether the cases between Standard Fashion
and Standard Oil of California so limited the earlier holding as to
account for the dissenting opinions in the latter. To the extent that
any of them did modify the Standard Fashion rule, we must then con-
sider how far the Standard Oil case in turn discredits these intervening
weakening decisions. For the present purpose cases like United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States,48 and International Business Ma-
chines Corp. v. United States," involving patent control, indisputable
domination of the industry, and tying clauses as well as exclusive supply
provisions, may be disregarded. They are plainly within the narrowest
construction of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, although the United
Shoe case is significant for its holding that contract provisions which
in practical effect prevent dealing in goods of a competitor are cov-
ered by Section 3 and must be judged by its standard, although the
contract does not expressly preclude such dealings. Federal Trade
Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co.,4' holding that a particular con-
tract is not within the explicit coverage of Section 3 because it sets up
an agency rather than a sale transaction, is likewise beside the present
point.
Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co.,49 however,
requires consideration. It is referred to in Justice Frankfurter's opin-
ion as one of the cases favorable to the Standard Oil contract. The
Sinclair case deals with one of the older methods of tying an "in-
dependent" station to a single supplier. In that case it was shown that
the leading oil companies leased tanks and pumps at nominal cost to
retailers under a contract by which the retailer agreed to use this
equipment only with gasoline furnished by the lessor. The Federal
Trade Commission found that a large majority of service station opera-
tors had no use for more than one set of this equipment and that in
practical effect, therefore, the lease was on the understanding that the
45. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); cf. Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U. S. 457 (1941) ; FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U. S. 37, 50 (1948) ("it would greatly handicap enforcement of the act to
require testimony to show what we believe to be self-evident . .
46. 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
47. 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
48. 260 U. S. 568 (1923).
49. 261 U. S. 463 (1923).
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lessee would deal exclusively in lessor's products. The Supreme Court
in an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds held (rightly or wrongly)
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the practical effect
of the arrangement was to make the dealer buy exclusively from his
equipment lessor."0 It was pointed out that the leases were terminable
at will on short notice and that lessees were always free to install addi-
tional equipment of their own or of other oil companies. The basis
for this decision, therefore, is that the leases in question were not
devices within the specific coverage of Section 3. It was, therefore,
unnecessary to determine whether the effect of such leases might be to
substantially lessen competition, i. e., to apply the Clayton Act standard
of legality.
However, the Federal Trade Commission had also proceeded
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which outlaws
"unfair methods of competition" in interstate commerce. Here Con-
gress had not legislated any new specific standard of legality and
Justice McReynolds had previously held that this phrase extended only
to practices otherwise condemned by law "as opposed to good morals
because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or
as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly
to hinder competition or create monopoly." "' The Clayton Act being
inapplicable, the only standards remaining to be applied were the more
flexible yardsticks of the Sherman Act or the common law. It was only
with respect to those standards as embraced in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act that the Court reviewed the evidence, finding
it inadequate to prove a probability of substantially lessened competi-
tion. Justice McReynolds' opinion gives no countenance to the erro-
neous dictum of the Circuit Court of Appeals that "in determining
whether given acts . . . substantially lessen competition and tend to
create a monopoly within the meaning of the Clayton Act, the only
standard of legality with which we are acquainted is the standard estab-
lished by the Sherman Act . . ." 5 Accordingly the Sinclair case
gives little support to the demand for a general economic inquiry in the
Standard Oil case, nor does it militate against the thesis that in the
case of a device admittedly within the coverage of the Clayton Act, the
inference of competitive harm can be drawn from the leading position
of the defendant.
50. On this point the circuit courts of appeal have distinguished the Sinclair
case so often and so subtly that it hardly survives as a precedent. See, for example,
Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F. 2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Judson L. Thom-
son Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F. 2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945) ; cf. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
51. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427-8 (1920).
52. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. FTC, 273, 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1921) also ignor-
ing the important difference in the standards of legality between § 3 of the Clayton
Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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However, the Sinclair case, particularly the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals opinion, misled the Seventh Circuit into a full Sherman Act
economic inquiry in a case calling for the application of the Clayton
Act standard. Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,3 involved the
legality of provisions in General Motors dealer contracts requiring
the dealer not to "sell, offer for sale, or use in the repair of [General
Motors automobiles] any part or parts not manufactured or author-
ized" by General Motors. The Seventh Circuit held that General
Motors' interest in maintaining customer good will in relation to its
cars and particularly the manufacturer's 90-day warranty against de-
fective parts
can be the basis for exception to the applicability of the
Clayton Act. . . . The record shows that competition in the
sale of replacement parts for automobiles instead of growing less
had substantially increased through the period during which the
provisions complained of have been in force and, while it may be
that competition would have increased more rapidly in the ab-
sence of such provisions, the trial court rightfully concluded that
such was not the 'substantial lessening of competition' which the
Clayton Act was designed to prevent.54
The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, three justices not partici-
pating, with a sentence accepting the findings of the lower courts that
"the effect of the clause had not been in any way substantially to
lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." '5
Here then is a real holding that an exclusive supply contract employed
by a leader in the industry may be justified by business considerations.
The Standard Oil case must be regarded as overruling the Pick
case, unless a distinction is to be made between the two cases based
upon the relationship of spare parts to an intricate machine for whose
performance General Motors feels a continuing responsibility.58 A
number of recent cases indicate that the distinction is not valid; that
neither supplies 57 nor replacement parts "8 may be tied to the sale of
53. 80 F. 2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U. S. 3 (1936).
54. 80 F. 2d 641, 643-644 (7th Cir. 1935).
55. 299 U. S. 3, 4 (1936).
56. The Pick case was not even limited to this situation. The contract in terms
forbade the dealer to sell non-GM parts even for use in non-GM automobiles, and
there was evidence that it was so construed by GM field inspectors and salesmen.
Printed Record in the Supreme Court, p. 86. See also Petitioner's Reply Brief, pp.
2-3.
57. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131, 138-
139 (1936) (the opinion exhibits an indifference to whether the tabulating cards were
regarded as supplies or parts) ; Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F. 2d 952,
958 (1st Cir. 1945) ; Radio Cori. of America v. Lord, 28 F. 2d 257, 260 (3d Cir.
1928) (Are radio tubes in a patented radio circuit "parts" or "supplies?").
58. See note 57 supra; General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937).
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the original machine, however dependent the machine is on the quality
of the product used in or with it. Perhaps these cases are not con-
trolling because most of them involve patent licenses to which special
rules are applicable. But their language supports a broad proposition
that the efficiency of uniting two products in use is a matter to be
judged by the user. The seller can protect his goodwill by insisting
that replacement parts meet his standards of efficiency, without preju-
dicing competition by requiring that the parts be bought from him."9
An extraordinary inversion of the principle that exclusive deal-
ing is too dangerous a weapon to be placed in the hands of industry
leaders is exemplified by General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,6" decided in the District Court for Dela-
ware in 1937. The case involved the legality of the patent licenses
of A. T. & T. covering sound recording and reproducing equipment
in the moving picture field. The licenses tied recording to reproduc-
ing equipment and required replacement parts to be purchased from
the licensor. The court held that this was lawful during the "pro-
motional" period, before others had developed competing equipment,
on the ground that it is impossible to restrain competition when there
are no competitors yet prepared to compete. 6 ' It is hard to imagine
a more effective means of forestalling development of competing
processes than the imposition of exclusive dealing contracts on the
trade by a great corporation which already has a patent lead on the
field. In evaluating this decision it is only necessary to note that it
starts from the false major premise that the Sherman and Clayton
Act standards of legality are identical.62  The fact that the exclusive
supply contracts are employed at the promotional stage is indeed sig-
nificant, if the promotion is by a new competitor invading a field where
others are already entrenched; it can hardly justify the first person
in the field in augmenting his patent domination by contract clauses
specifically condemned in the Clayton Act."
59. Even the doctrine of deference to the concurrent findings of two lower courts,
upon which the Supreme Court rested in affirming the Pick case, is not likely again
to save a restriction of this character, for the Court has shown a willingness to dis-
criminate between factual controversies, which it is reluctant to review, and controver-
sies which, although resolved in terms that sound factual, really turn on standards
of judgment to be applied. See Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1348 (1949).
60. 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937).
61. Id. at 666.
62. Id. at 664; Excelsior Motor Mfg. Co. v. Sound Equipment, Inc., 73 F. 2d 725,
728 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 706 (1935) ; cf. United States Tel. Co.
v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 U. S. 65, 73 (1912) (disapproving under the Sherman
Act contracts of weaker competitor for exclusive rendering of long distance service
to local exchanges, in part because of excessive 99 year term). See Stockhausen, The
Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L.
Q. 412, 424-428 (1948).
63. Another case difficult to reconcile with the current of authority on tendency
to lessen competition is Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp. and Standard Oil of New
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The principle which this essay draws from the Standard Oil case,
that leadership in a line of commerce is a sufficient and conclusive
bar to the employment of the anti-competitive devices named in the
Clayton Act, is not impugned by cases like Oxford Varnish Corp v.
Ault and Wiborg Corp.64 and Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. Federal
Trade Coimission,5 in each of which appear statements that the com-
pany's relative position in the trade is not the measure of the monopo-
listic tendency of its practices. In each instance the statement is made
in the course of an opinion adverse to the use of the tying clause,
in answer to the company's contention that the Clayton Act forbids
tying only by industry leaders. Neither the Standard Fashion nor
the Standard Oil case supports that contention; they hold only that
anti-competitive devices are illegal when they are employed by big
organizations. It is still open to the Federal Trade Commission to
conclude on the basis of testimony that exclusive dealing contracts
of smaller corporations involve a probability of substantial lessening
of competition.
In the Oxford case this conclusion was reached in relation to a
company doing only one percent of the business, but since the com-
pany was tying to patents the Court could lean on the abuse of patent
theory as an independent basis of illegality. In the Signode case
the company did about 25% of the national business in the
"line of commerce" as ultimately defined by the Commission and the
Court. Together with its two leading competitors, who followed a
similar practice, it did two thirds to three quarters of the business.
Such a position in the field would under our interpretation of the
Standard Oil case justify the Commission in refusing to hear evidence
as to the actual effect of the practice on competitors, the good faith,
non-monopolistic intentions of the respondent, or the advantages to
customers and the public. The respondent had, however, argued that
the line of commerce embraced all wire and strapping used in packag-
ing, rather than wire and strapping used in machine packaging, which
York, 87 F. 2d 265 (1st Cir. 1937). Plaintiff, a retail gas distributor, alleged that
defendant in violation of § 3 sold tank car lots of gasoline at lower prices to dealers
who agreed to handle only Socony gas. Plaintiff alleged that his tank car competitors
who had accepted exclusive arrangements were advantaged by this price concession.
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained partly on the ground that this was not a
sufficient allegation of substantial lessening of competition. The court held that in
view of the uniform retail price for gasoline Standard's practice had not affected
Lipson's sales but only his profit margin, as compared with that of his exclusive deal-
ing competitors, so that competition was not substantially lessened! If this case is to
be understood as requiring proof that the particular private complainant has lost busi-
ness, as a necessary element of Clayton Act illegallity, it goes far beyond any other
holding. It is hardly to be doubted, in view of the Standard Oil case, that Socony's
practice was illegal, and the only problem for future Lipson's is to establish damages.
64. 83 F. 2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
65. 132 F. 2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942).
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the Commission conceived to be the relevant field of competition.
On the company's hypothesis it did only 5 to 7% of the business.
While this figure seems adequate to invoke the doctrine of the Standard
Oil case,66 it is low enough to have justified the Commission's will-
ingness to entertain a broader economic inquiry in the unsettled state
of the law prior to the Standard Oil decision. A bolder course calcu-
lated to shorten hearings by pretermitting theoretical and inconclusive
analyses and forecasts of interested experts may be looked for in
future cases under Section 3 of the Clayton Act involving industry
leaders.
ACQUISITION OF STOCK CONTROL
The most interesting effects of the Standard Oil construction of
Section 3 of the Clayton Act may be expected in connection with two
other sections of the Act which employ substantially the same standard
of legality. Section 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
deals with discrimination in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality "where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any persons who either grant or knowingly
receive the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them." Section 7 deals with acquisition of stock in competing cor-
porations "where the effect of such acquisition may be to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce." 67
The Supreme Court's decisions have reduced the substantive
scope of Section 7 to an easily evaded technical obstruction to mergers
and consolidations, 68 but the transactions that remain within the re-
stricted coverage of the section must still be measured by the Clayton
Act standard. International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Com-
66. See discussion infra p. 38. Cf. B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed.
720 (7th Cir. 1923) (one-percent position with other suppliers offering non-exclusive
distributions, justifies broader inquiry into actual effect) ; Judson L. Thomson Mfg.
Co. v. FTC, 150 F. 2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945) [Company doing 257 of the business and
all other important competitors also employing leases of riveting machines with tying
clauses-evidence of technical or economic justification for tying given no weight:
"the open market not the court should be the forum for the presentation of claims as
to the merits of tied articles" (p. 958) ].
67. The standard contains appropriate adaptations in other paragraphs of § 7
dealing with acquisition of stock in competing corporations by a holding company not
itself engaged in that competition.
68. The Act does not in terms cover transfers of assets, and the Supreme Court
in Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U. S. 554 (1926) held that the Commission was
powerless to undo such a transfer even if it was accomplished by illegal stock acquisi-
tion unless the Commission instituted proceedings while the company still held the
illegally acquired stock; cf. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U. S. 587
(1934) ; FINAL REPORT AND REcOmMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL Eco-
Nomic COMMITTEE, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1941).
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mission " is the leading case in which the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to apply the standard of legality to a transaction within
the specific coverage of Section 7. In May 1921 International Shoe
Company acquired the stock of the McElwain Company. These were
two of the largest shoe manufacturers in the world. The Federal
Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order based on a find-
ing that the transaction would substantially lessen competition be-
tween the two companies in the sale of dress shoes. The Supreme
Court set aside the Commission's order on the grounds that (1) the
companies did not substantially compete with each other in view of
differences in their shoes and distribution methods; and (2) the
financial straits in which McElwain found itself at the end of the
1920-1921 depression coupled with International's need for additional
manufacturing facilities indicated a good faith 71 choice by the parties
of the best means of salvaging the investment in McElwain and solv-
ing the production problems of International. The merger was sus-
tained by a vote of 6-3, with Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis
dissenting. The majority opinion by Justice Sutherland in effect
obliterated the distinction between the Sherman and Clayton Act
standards of legality, citing with approval a Third Circuit opinion
which "applied the test to the Clayton Act, which had theretofore
been applicable to the Sherman Act, namely that the standard of
legality was the absence or presence of prejudice to the public interest
by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course
of trade" 7' (italics supplied).
The opinion can be accounted for only by the fact that, in con-
trast with the briefing of the Standard Fashion case, the govern-
ment's perfunctory brief here let the question of the distinctive mean-
ing of the Clayton Act standard go by default, accepting battle on
the narrow issue tendered by the petitioner as to the sufficiency of
evidence of the motives for the merger and the likelihood of further
competition if the merger were disapproved, as if there were common
agreement on the scope of inquiry called for by the Clayton Act
standard. It is not by inadvertence that the Clayton Act speaks in
terms of effect rather than motive or intent, and in giving considera-
tion to such arguments the International Shoe case is certainly dis-
credited by the Standard Oil decision refusing even to hear evidence
69. 280 U. S. 291 (1930).
70. "Not with a purpose to lessen competition," id. at 302.
71. Id. at 299. The case referred to was Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81
(3d Cir. 1922), involving an equipment deal similar to the one sustained in FTC v.
Sinclair Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923), discussed supra p. 24.
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on the economic justifications for the forbidden device.72  Powerful
competitors can always pay more for a business than independent
buyers. It is not merely that the leaders of the industry have the
advantage of accumulated capital and "know-how." They can and
will pay a premium for eliminating competition. Inteinational Shoe
could well afford to pay more than the forced sale value of the
McElwain property in order to end McElwain as a competitor and
to prevent the more effective competition which could be expected if
outsiders bought the McElwain property at low liquidation prices 7
or if the company were reorganized to reduce capital costs. To en-
courage such bidding for partial protection from the rigors of com-
petition is to turn the antitrust laws upside down and to increase by
law the existing advantages of the largest units in the field in the race
to preempt markets.
Furthermore, there was no necessity for the International Shoe
case to turn on the substantiality of competition between International
and McElwain. The government was remiss in its presentation, in
failing to call attention to the substantial probability that the merger
of two leading shoe manufacturers would impair competition not only
between them in the sale of shoes, but also between their distributors,
the breadth of whose commercial rivalry would certainly be reduced
when their sources of supply came under a single domination. Ver-
tical as well as horizontal competition is protected by Section 7; the
suspect transaction is acquisition of stock in any corporation, not
merely in a competing corporation, for the reference in the qualifying
clause to diminution of competition between competing corporations
is placed in the alternative with the usual phraseology found in the
other Sections of the Act as to effect on competition generally. In
72. The circuit courts of appeal prior to the Intematioul Shoe case had also
refused to give weight to such considerations. See Swift & Company v. FTC, 8 F. 2d
595, 599 (7th Cir. 1925) : "if an exception to the operation of the statute ought and
is to be raised in cases where the concern whose stock is acquired is comparatively
small or weak, or for any reason unlikely long to endure, it must come through statu-
tory enactment, and not by judicial construction"; Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC,
284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U. S. 616, rejecting, as justification for
acquisition of stock control of competing aluminum fabricator by the dominant alumi-
num company, the contention that the fabricator was failing and its output under
ALCOA management necessary to the war effort. The physical assets were subse-
quently acquired by ALCOA. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Comm.,
299 Fed. 361 (3d Cir. 1924). United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117
(N. D. Ohio 1935) represents the extreme application of the view that the qualifying
clause in Section 7 retains in the Clayton Act the broad Sherman Act "rule of rea-
son" and "public interest" standards. But see n. 78, infra. Cf. Vancouver Malt &
Sake Co. v. Vancouver Breweries, Ltd., [1934] App. Cas. 181, rejecting covenantor's
financial straits as justification for a non-ancillary restraint of trade.
73. Compare the acquisition of Consolidated Steel Co. by United States Steel
Corp. approved by the Supreme Court in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U. S. 495 (1948) ; and the successful high bid of the United States Steel Corp. for
the war surplus steel plant at Geneva, Utah, approved by the Attorney General as
consistent with the antitrust laws. Id. at 505.
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view of the various possibilities of impairing competition by the
merger of dominant units in the field, it is apparent that the authority
of the International Shoe case, and its progeny 7' has been consider-
ably undermined by the Standard Oil decision.
Even so recent a decision as Ford Motor Co. v. United States 71
must be reappraised in the light of the latest reaffirmation of the crucial
significance of size under the Clayton Act. In that case Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority in a 4-3 decision, refused to extend a
provision in a Sherman Act consent decree barring Ford from acquir-
ing an interest in Commercial Investment Trust, an automobile finance
company. Justices Black, Rutledge and Douglas protested, in effect,
that affiliation between the producer of 25% of the nation's automobiles
and a single financer was illegal per se. Any doubt that Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in the Ford case rests on the peculiar pro-
cedural situation in that case rather than on the legality of the affilia-
tion is now dispelled. Certainly if the Ford-C. I. T. affiliation takes
the form of acquisition of stock within Section 7, it may be an-
ticipated that a majority of the Court will be willing to infer sub-
stantial impairment of competition from the major position of Ford
and C. I. T. in the automobile and financing business, and ready
to sustain the Federal Trade Commission and the lower courts in
turning a deaf ear to arguments of competitive necessity, business
expedience and the like. Certainly we shall not find the courts as
receptive as formerly to evidence or argument that competition be-
tween two companies may continue and even increase following the
establishment of common control between them! 71 On the other
hand, although the language of Section 7 would literally forbid merger
of small competitors if, as would inevitably be the case, competition
between them would be eliminated, it would be unlikely and unde-
sirable that the Federal Trade Commission proceed in such case. Con-
solidation of competitors too small for efficient operation may ac-
tually promote competition as the effective regulator of trade in a
field dominated by others.77 Thus the acquisition by one of the big
five meat packers of two competing provincial packing houses might
74. For example, In re Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp. 329, 338-339 (N. D.
Pa. 1936) approving plan of reorganization involving sale of stock in an important
producer of freight cars to a corporation engaged in manufacturing cars and in trans-
portation.
75. 335 U. S. 303 (1948).
76. See Standard Fashion's argument that it was in competition with its affiliates.
Petitioner's Original Brief in No. 20, Oct. Term 1921, U. S. S. C., p. 47; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Penna. R. R., 66 F. 2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd 4-4,
291 U. S. 651 (1934) ; Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F. 2d 656 (3d Cir."
1931) ; Intercorporate Stock Owniership and the Clayton Act, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1395,
1397 (1934).
77. Cf. U. S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 539 (1948).
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be prevented,78 whereas a consolidation of the local firms to meet the
threat from the giants in the industry might be condoned.
Summarizing the analysis of the Clayton Act standard as ap-
plied under Section 7, it must be recognized that the Courts have
heretofore very nearly obliterated in the merger field all distinction
between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act standards of legality.
Following the lead of the International Shoe dictum that only such
acquisitions are forbidden as "probably will result in lessening compe-
tition . . to such a degree as will injuriously affect the pub-
lic . . .," 7 they have rarely .refused to give ear to an argument of
business expedience or putative public benefits from a challenged con-
solidation, even by large units in the field. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
reminder that the Clayton Act standard of legality is distinct and
narrower than that of the Sherman Act should serve to check the bound-
less inquiries into "public interest" which the advocates of merger
have heretofore successfully pressed on the courts. At least where
merger involves already predominant units, we may expect as a re-
sult of the Standard Oil case to see the courts take a firmer grip on the
notion that it is the potential danger to competition from inter-cor-
porate stockholding and not presently demonstrable results which is
the issue put by Section 7, and that this potentiality rises to pro-
hibitive levels when an enterprise which has already achieved great
power expands by this method.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Again and again we encounter in Clayton Act controversies a
predilection for putting issues in the form of extreme alternatives,
neither of which is acceptable to an unbiased analyst. A device is
either "illegal per se" or else an untrammeled investigation of "pub-
lic interest" must be had. Nowhere is this polarity more frequently
encountered than in the touchy field of price discrimination under Sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,8"
especially in its application to delivered price systems. Both the govern-
ment and industry are driven by different circumstances to exag-
78. As was done in Swift & Co. v. FTC. 8 F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1925), reversed
on other .qrounds in Swift & Co. v. FTC, 272 U. S. 554 (1926). The opinion in
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 Fed. Supp. 117 (N. D. Ohio 1935), per-
mitting the third largest steel company (7.2% of the national ingot capacity) to ac-
quire stock control of a competitor which was the twelfth largest unit in the industry
rests on a complete and erroneous assimilation of the Clayton Act standard of legality
to that of the Sherman Act. But the opinion also reflects an inclination to permit
defensive integration of smaller units in an industry already dominated by U. S. Steel
and Bethlehem Steel.
79. 280 U. S. 291, 298 (1930).
80. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1941).
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gerated constructions of Supreme Court decisions. The Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division, with limited staff, must quail
at the prospect of endless hearings on the competitive virtues of basing
point and other pricing systems involving discrimination,"' and press
close to illegality per se as an aid to effective enforcement. On the other
hand, counsel for industry will for obvious reasons acknowledge no
restriction on the scope of inquiry into the reasonableness of uniform
delivered prices in a competitive market. But let the Court write an
opinion favorable to the government and the positions are reversed.
Industry storms the halls of Congress contending that all delivered
pricing has now been rendered illegal per se so that legislative relief
is necessary. Meanwhile the commission, apprehensive of crippling
amendments, deprecates the latest pronouncement, but moderately. 2
It cannot disclaim too much; no experienced government attorney
would countenance a broad concession in public statements of policy
on so complicated an issue, for fear of compromising the next case.
So ensues an era of "confusion" regarding delivered pricing, which
Congress undertakes to clarify.83 At the time of this writing a bill
awaits Senate action on amendments adopted by the House. 4 The
familiar Clayton Act standard of legality would be retained by the
House amendments, but the Senate version would constitute a radical
retrogression towards Sherman Act standards. The Senate proposes
to define "effect may be" so as to require "substantial and probative
evidence" of the specified anti-competitive tendencies, rather than rea-
sonable probability. It would also substitute "will" for "may" in the
clause "where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition."
Both houses have approved a provision that "price shall have the
meaning which it has under the commercial law applicable to the trans-
action," which ambiguously curtails the substantive reach of the dis-
crimination section.
If Congress retains the traditional Clayton Act formula, the
Standard Oil case as herein interpreted offers a basis for avoiding, in
the most important applications of Section 2, both the rigid doctrine
81. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 686 (1948), referring to 49,000
pages of oral testimony and 50,000 pages of exhibits. A "digest" of the evidence
before the Commission in the Cement case, filed as "Appendix A" to the Circuit Court
of Appeals brief, runs to 3110 pages.
82. See Federal Trade Commission statement of "Policy Towards Geographic
Pricing Practices," Oct. 12, 1948; Study of Federal Trade Commission Pricing Poli-
cies, Interim Report of the Trade Policies Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, SEN. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949).
83. See STUDY OF FEDERAL TRADE CommIssloN PRIcING POLICIES, note 82 supra,
especially the legislation recommended at pages 75-77, which has been radically modi-
fied by both Senate and House.
84. S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Senate print of Aug. 8, 1949), §§ 2, 3 and 4.
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of illegality per se and the administratively impossible "public interest"
inquiry. Discriminations within the specific coverage of the section
will be held unlawful without further investigation, if found to be
employed by major units in the trade. To smaller units wider scope
of proof will be allowed on the issue of tendency to lessen competition.
In the price discrimination field, the courts have been more con-
cerned with the difficult problem of determining what transactions are
within the specific coverage of Section 2 than with the application of
the standard of legality. The current controversy over delivered price
systems is largely a quarrel over the definition of "price." Does the
seller "discriminate in price" when he charges the same amount to
near and distant buyers, although it costs more to deliver the goods
to the distant buyer? Does price mean the amount realized by the
seller after deducting delivery cost to the particular buyer? If so,
the seller engages in discrimination unless he charges all customers
the same price at the point of production plus actual delivery cost,
i. e., unless he sells on an f. o. b. basis. The opinions in the Corn
Products I" and Cement Institute 86 cases appear to answer the fore-
going questions in the affirmative, unless Congress redefines "price"
as indicated above." Even if a discrimination or difference of price
is established, it may be excluded from the scope of the section by one
of the provisos, still without reaching the problem of the Clayton Act
standard of legality. Thus a differential among customers can be
justified by showing that it reflects only cost savings resulting from
different methods or quantities of sale or delivery, 8 or by showing that
changes in market conditions between successive sales account for any
difference in price to the different purchasers.8" But if the seller can-
not justify his price differential in one of these ways, then it becomes
necessary to determine whether the effect of the discrimination may
be that condemned by the Act.
Typically the evidence used to establish the anti-competitive
tendency of price discrimination is proof that the discrimination was
large enough to enable the seller or his favored customer to lure busi-
85. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945).
86. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
87. Cf. §4(g) of S. 236 recommended by the Trade Policies Subcommittee,
supra note 82, at page 77: "For the purpose of determining the existence of discrim-
ination, the word price as used in this section shall mean the delivered cost paid by the
buyer for the commodity or product at the time and place such commodity or product
is accepted by him, without deduction on account of any transportation or delivery
charge incidental thereto."
88. First proviso to § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Prior to the Act quan-
tity discounts were legal although they might exceed cost savings, regardless of effect
on competition.
89. Fourth proviso to § 2(a), id.
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ness away from competitors." There is little opportunity in the ordi-
nary price discrimination case for economic justifications of the kind
which have had some success under Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act. It is difficult to argue that a price discrimination serves any
business purpose comparable to the protection of good will said to re-
sult from tying the sale of replacement parts to the sale of the original
machine, or to the promotion of dealer zeal and responsibility said to
result from exclusive dealing, or to the enhancement of productive
efficiency said to result from vertical integration achieved by merger.
One argument of this character that is met in price discrimina-
tion cases is that a discrimination which impairs competition among
buyers may nevertheless be lawful because it promotes competition
among sellers.9 Thus, uniform delivered prices which are preferential
to distant buyers are defended on the ground that these price con-
cessions enable the seller to compete in distant markets which would
otherwise be monopolized by local suppliers. Such arguments would
require the court or commission to gauge not only the harmful poten-
tialities of the practice on competition at the retail level but also the
beneficent potentialities at the wholesale level and then to balance the
two, a hopeless exercise in the arithmetic of intangibles. Some recog-
nition seems to be given to this line of argument by the text of the
Robinson-Patman Act itself; Section 2 (b) provides that a
seller may, in rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination,
show that his lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competing seller. But this explicit provision does no
more than assure the respondent an opportunity to introduce evidence
which might otherwise be excluded as irrelevant. Proof of good faith
meeting of competition does not require an acquittal under Section 2.
The Commission may, despite such proof, conclude that the impairment
of competition at the retail level is a greater threat to competition in
that line of commerce than the injury which wholesale competition
may suffer if the discrimination is forbidden. In Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana v. Federal Trade Commission," now pending in the Supreme
90. See Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726, 738-739 (1945) ; Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 173 F. 2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148
F. 2d 378-379 (2d Cir. 1945) ; but cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 45
(1948). The Robinson-Patman Act amended the standard of legality under § 2 by
adding a specific reference to impairment of competition among buyers and their cus-
tomers. The Supreme Court had already held that such competition was protected
under the original Clayton Act standard. Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can
Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
91. STUDY OF FEDERAL TRADE COmmIssiOx PRica PoLIcIEs, SEN. Doc. No. 27, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 9-12 (1949).
92. 173 F. 2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949) ; but see Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.
2d 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1945) (good faith meeting of competition characterized as a
"defense"). Under the House amendments to S. 1008, a seller "may justify" a dis-
crimination on the ground of good faith meeting of competition only if the effect on
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Court, this nice question was resolved against the seller by the Com-
mission and the Court of Appeal. If the Supreme Court is willing to
carry over into Section 2 the test of potential impairment of competi-
tion which this essay derives from the Standard of California case, the
decision could be affirmed with little difficulty.
A second argument heard in justification of price discrimination
is that it may promote competition among buyers by enabling the
favored buyer to stay in business. 3  Thus, in the uniform delivered
price debate it is said that the distant buyer must have price conces-
sions in order to stay in competition with buyers closer to the source
of supply. This is a fantastic perversion of the ideal of competition,
suggesting that businessmen with uneconomic locations should be
subsidized at the expense of their competitors and the public, whereas
the whole point of competition as the law of trade is that entrepreneurs
who misjudge any of the economic factors relevant to their business
should lose out to their wiser rivals. This defense of price discrimi-
nation involves a principle which, once adopted, can lead only to a
theoretical and practical muddle in the regulation of our economic
affairs. If "competition" is to be maintained by allowing sellers to
subsidize uneconomically located buyers, why not also permit a seller
to discriminate in favor of a buyer whose inefficient plant or bad
labor relations also place him at a disadvantage? For the present
purpose it is enough to note that, like the defense of discrimination
previously considered, this one would require the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the courts to undertake the almost impossible adminis-
trative task of determining just how much discrimination can be
tolerated in order to overcome the favored buyer's disadvantige in
location, productive efficiency, etc.
The doctrine of the Standard Oil case offers a practicable means
of avoiding these difficulties in the cases that really count. If it is
remembered that the whole apparatus of the antitrust laws was erected
to deal with the problem of concentration of economic power, we can
competition is not that prohibited by the familiar Clayton Act standard. § 3 of S.
1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. print of Aug. 8, 1949.
The justification of meeting competition is unavailing where competitors' prices
are met so systematically and precisely, with never an offer to undersell in one's own
freight advantage territory, that the arrangement is evidently one to avoid price com-
petition rather than to compete. Such a showing not only negatives good faith, but
affirmatively shows that the effect of the systematic discrimination is to substantially
lessen competition among the sellers. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746
(1945).
93. Supra note 91. The Interstate Commerce Commission has acted on this basis
in approving "Group Rates." Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. U. S., 69 Sup. Ct. 278
(1949) ; Lynchburg Traffic Bureau v. U. S., 84 F. Supp. 1012 (D. W. Va. 1949). But
judicial approval rests on a statute expressly conferring on the administrative agency
the power to fix rates in an area of the economy where concededly the role of com-
petition has been circumscribed.
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for practical purposes forget about price discrimination as a vice
of individual small businesses. 4  If the Commission initiates such
cases, no great harm can come from allowing a generous scope to
evidence designed to show the non-monopolistic tendency of the ac-
cused practice. Respondents lacking the resources of the great cor-
porations for litigation are unlikely to create a serious administrative
problem.
But for the leaders in any line of trade all efforts to justify price
discrimination should be precluded. The Standard Oil case and its
predecessor the Standard Fashion case show that the anti-competitive
potentiality of devices like exclusive dealing, the holding company, and
price discrimination, which led Congress to place them under the
special standard of the Clayton Act, are enhanced beyond the legal
tolerance level whenever the device is employed by an organization
already possessed of great economic power. 5
WHEN COMPANY IS "MAJOR FACTOR"
The discussion has purposely avoided attempting to define the
scope of operations which will make a company a "major factor" or
a "leading, though not singly dominant, unit" in the trade, so that it
must abjure the devices named in the Clayton Act. The problem is
not unlike that of stating the amount of commerce necessary to con-
stitute a "monopoly" under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and in
both instances is almost inextricably intermingled with the decision
as to the base figure with which defendant's share of business is to
be compared, i. e., definition of the relevant market. 8 The critical
94. The case is different, of course, where small businesses participate in an
industry-wide system of price discrimination designed to produce price uniformity.
95. MACHLUP, THE BASING POINT SYSTEM 23 (1948), points out that basing
point pricing ipjures competition not only because it lends itself to agreement for price
maintenance, "but also because, in the hands of powerful firms, it can be an instrument
of oppression used to dominate weaker competitors" (italics supplied). See also id.
at 159-164, 170-171. On the relationship between economic concentration and basing
point pricing see Latham, Giantimn and Basing Points: a Political Analysis, 58 YALE
L. J. 383 (1949); LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIIC POWER (1946), dis-
cussing relationship of basing point pricing to price leadership at pages 174 et seq.
An awareness of this relationship appears also in the dissenting opinion of judge
Stone in Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F. 2d 768-771 (8th Cir. 1934).
96. E. g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948) ; United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) under the Sherman Act; Oxford Var-
nish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp. and Judson L. Thomson Co. v. FTC, supra notes
57, 64, under the Clayton Act.
In this connection it seems clear that the specific reference in § 7 of the Clayton
Act to restraint of commerce "in any section or community" does not impose a stricter
test for local restraints than does the phrase "in any line of commerce" used in §§ 2
and 3. The variation seems to have been one of the accidents of the legislative process,
for the Senate Judiciary Committee explained the deletion of the more restrictive
language on the ground of surplusage. SEN. RE. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 46
(1914). Local markets are commonly regarded as the base for determining Sherman
Act violations. See Columbia Steel case, supra.
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figure will in any event be much lower under the Clayton Act, consis-
tent with its basic purpose to reach trade restraints in their incipiency
and to nip monopoly in the bud.
The Standard Oil case, involving the leading company in the
area, with 23% of the gasoline business, is suggestive but hardly
sets the lower limits of the application of the doctrine. Much more
significant is the fact that the decision struck down Standard's ex-
clusive dealing arrangements on tires and batteries. In each of these
lines, Standard's exclusive contracts covered approximately 2% of the
Western trade.17  These figures underline a danger in the "substan-
tial share of the market" test espoused by the Supreme Court opinion.
If a 2% share is substantial when held by Standard, it is hard to
see how it could be held insubstantial in the hands of a new competi-
tor invading the field. Yet neither on policy nor as a matter of legis-
lative intent are the two situations identical with respect to likelihood
of substantial lessening of competition. They can be distinguished
only by comparing the total power which the two organizations can
bring to bear in the particular field of competition. Such a compari-
son would take into account not only the share of the tire market
already encompassed by Standard, but also its special access to tire
buyers resulting from control of gasoline stations, and might well lead
to the result that Standard can have no exclusive dealing contracts
whatever for tires. When a giant corporation expands in its own or
adjacent markets, it can hardly assert the equities of the small new-
comer in whose interest Congress qualified the absolute prohibition
of exclusive dealing during the enactment of the Clayton Act.9
It is interesting to speculate on what the Supreme Court would
now do if called upon to apply the Clayton Act to a set of facts like
those in the Columbia Steel case. There the Court refused, 5-4, to
find a violation of the Sherman Act in the acquisition by the greatest
steel company in the world of the physical assets of the largest in-
dependent steel fabricator in the West. The acquired company con-
sumed about 3% of the rolled steel plates and shapes sold in the
West. This was held an insubstantial share of the market, so that
the exclusion of U. S. Steel's competitors from this outlet was "rea-
sonable" and lawful in view of the sound business reasons for the
97. Including business handled through company-owned stations, Standard's total
share is about 4%. See United States v. Standard Oil Co.. 78 F. Supp. 850, 868-
869 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
98. See Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F. 2d 764, 766 (6th
Cir. 1936) ("Conceivably a business practice may tend to create monopoly though
barely entered upon").
99. See Argument of Solicitor General Beck in the Standard Fashion case, mtpra
note 42; Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. U. S., 337 U. S. 293, 307 n. 10 (1949).
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transaction advanced by the participants. Mr. Justice Reed said,
"Exclusive dealings for rolled steel between Consolidated and United
States Steel, brought about by vertical integration or otherwise, are
not illegal, at any rate until the effect of such control is to unrea-
sonably restrict the opportunities of competitors to market their
product." 100 But perhaps this dictum was meant to be confined to
interpretation of the Sherman Act, the only charge before the Court.
Would the Court in a Clayton Act case hold that the monopolistic
potentialities of Clayton Act devices must be judged by the power of
the user rather than the degree of exclusion already achieved? Un-
less it takes this tack, refusing to encourage elaborate inquiries into
purposes, future markets, prospects for regional development, and the
virtues of vertical integration, which were permitted in the Columbia
case, the Clayton Act is in poorer state than its most anxious friends
have supposed. U. S. Steel would be free to swallow its competitors
and their market outlets, so long as it bit off only 3% at a time,
whether by exclusive dealing contract or by acquisition of controlling
stock. Even the long pending proposals to check the merger move-
ment by extending Section 7 to acquisition of assets as well as stock
will prove ineffectual under such a standard of legality. A new critical
issue in the antitrust controversy will have been formulated: Should
the Clayton Act be amended to prohibit, without qualification, the
employment of specified anti-competitive devices by business units
having more than X millions of assets or Y% of any relevant
market? 101
100. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 524 (1948).
101. The Temporary National Economic Committee made a similar recommenda-
tion limited to the merger problem. See its FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
SEN. Doc. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1941).
